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Abstract
It is often argued that an agent making deci-
sions on behalf of two or more principals who
have different utility functions should adopt a
Pareto-optimal policy, i.e., a policy that cannot
be improved upon for one agent without mak-
ing sacrifices for another. A famous theorem of
Harsanyi shows that, when the principals have
a common prior on the outcome distributions
of all policies, a Pareto-optimal policy for the
agent is one that maximizes a fixed, weighted
linear combination of the principals’ utilities.
In this paper, we show that Harsanyi’s theorem
does not hold for principals with different pri-
ors, and derive a more precise generalization
which does hold, which constitutes our main
result. In this more general case, the relative
weight given to each principal’s utility should
evolve over time according to how well the
agent’s observations conform with that princi-
pal’s prior. The result has implications for the
design of contracts, treaties, joint ventures, and
robots.
1 Introduction
As AI systems take on an increasingly pivotal decision-
making role in human society, an important question
arises: Whose values should a powerful decision-making
machine be built to serve? [Bostrom, 2014]
Consider, informally, a scenario wherein two or more
principals—perhaps individuals, companies, or states—
are considering cooperating to build or otherwise obtain
an “agent” that will then interact with an environment
on their behalf. The “agent” here could be anything that
follows a policy, such as a robot, a corporation, or a web-
based AI system. In such a scenario, the principals will
be concerned with the question of “how much” the agent
will prioritize each principal’s interests, a question which
this paper addresses quantitatively.
One might be tempted to model the agent as maximizing
the expected value, given its observations, of some util-
ity function U of the environment that equals a weighted
sum
w1U1 + w2U2 (1)
of the principals’ individual utility functions U1 and
U2, as Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem [Harsanyi,
1980] recommends. Then the question of prioritization
could be reduced to that of choosing values for the
weights wi.
However, this turns out to be a suboptimal approach,
from the perspective of the principals. As we shall see in
Proposition 1, this solution form is not generally compat-
ible with Pareto-optimality when agents have different
beliefs. Harsanyi’s setting does not account for agents
having different priors, nor for decisions being made se-
quentially, after future observations.
In such a setting, we need a new form of solution, exhib-
ited in this paper. The solution is presented along with
a recursion (Theorem 3) that characterizes solutions by
a process algebraically similar to, but meaningfully dif-
ferent from, Bayesian updating. The updating process
resembles a kind of bet-settling between the principals,
which allows them each to expect to benefit from the ve-
racity of their own beliefs.
Qualitatively, this phenomenon can be seen in isolation
whenever two people make a bet on a piece of decision-
irrelevant trivia. If neither Alice nor Bob would base
any important decision on whether Michael Jackson was
born in 1958 or 1959, they might still make a bet for
$100 on the answer. For a person chosen to arbitrate
the bet (their “agent”), Michael Jackson’s birth year now
becomes a decision-relevant observation: it determines
which of Alice and Bob gets the money!
Even in scenarios where differences in belief are not
decision-irrelevant, once might expect some “degree” of
bet-settling to arise from the disagreement. The main re-
sult of this paper (Theorem 3) is a precise formulation of
exactly how and how much a Pareto-optimal agent will
tend to prioritize each of its principals over time, as a re-
sult of differences in their implicit predictions about the
agent’s observations.
Related work
This paper may be viewed as extending or compliment-
ing results in several areas:
Value alignment theory. The “single principal” value
alignment problem—that of aligning the value function
of an agent with the values of single human, or a team
of humans in close agreement with one another—is al-
ready a very difficult one and should not be swept under
the rug; approaches like inverse reinforcement learning
(IRL) [Russell, 1998] [Ng et al., 2000] [Abbeel and Ng,
2004] and cooperative inverse reinforcement learning
(CIRL) [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016] have only begun
to address it.
Social choice theory. The whole of social choice the-
ory and voting theory may be viewed as an attempt to
specify an agreeable formal policy to enact on behalf of a
group. Harsanyi’s utility aggregation theorem [Harsanyi,
1980] suggests one form of solution: maximizing a lin-
ear combination of group members’ utility functions.
The present work shows that this solution is inappro-
priate when principals have different beliefs, and Theo-
rem 3 may be viewed as an extension of Harsanyi’s form
that accounts simultaneously for differing priors and the
prospect of future observations. Indeed, Harsanyi’s form
follows as a direct corollary of Theorem 3 when princi-
pals do share the same beliefs (Corollary 4).
Bargaining theory. The formal theory of bar-
gaining, as pioneered by [Nash, 1950] and carried
on by [Myerson, 1979], [Myerson, 2013], and
[Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983], is also topical.
Future investigation in this area might be aimed at
generalizing their work to sequential decision-making
settings, and this author recommends a focus on research
specifically targeted at resolving conflicts.
Multi-agent systems. There is ample literature ex-
amining multi-agent systems using sequential decision-
making models. Shoham and Leyton-Brown [2008] sur-
vey various models of multiplayer games using an MDP
to model each agent’s objectives. Chapter 9 of the same
text surveys social choice theory, but does not account
for sequential decision-making.
Zhang and Shah [2014] may be considered a sequen-
tial decision-making approach to social choice: they use
MDPs to represent the decisions of players in a compet-
itive game, and exhibit an algorithm for the players that,
if followed, arrives at a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium
satisfying a certain fairness criterion. Among the litera-
ture surveyed here, that paper is the closest to the present
work in terms of its intended application: roughly speak-
ing, achieving mutually desirable outcomes via sequen-
tial decision-making. However, that work is concerned
with an ongoing interaction between the players, rather
than selecting a policy for a single agent to follow as in
this paper.
Multi-objective sequential decision-making. There
is also a good deal of work on Multi-Objective Op-
timization (MOO) [Tzeng and Huang, 2011], including
for sequential decision-making, where solution meth-
ods have been called Multi-Objective Reinforcement
Learning (MORL). For instance, Ga´bor et al. [1998] in-
troduce a MORL method called Pareto Q-learning for
learning a set of a Pareto-optimal polices for a Multi-
Objective MDP (MOMDP). Soh and Demiris [2011] de-
fine Multi-Reward Partially Observable Markov Deci-
sion Processes (MR-POMDPs), and use use genetic al-
gorithms to produce non-dominated sets of policies for
them. Roijers et al. [2015] refer to the same problems as
Multi-objective POMDPS (MOPOMDPs), and provide a
bounded approximation method for the optimal solution
set for all possible weightings of the objectives. Wang
[2014] surveys MORL methods, and contributes Multi-
Objective Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MOMCTS) for dis-
covering multiple Pareto-optimal solutions to a multi-
objective optimization problem. Wray and Zilberstein
[2015] introduce Lexicographic Partially Observable
Markov Decision Process (LPOMDPs), along with two
accompanying solution methods.
However, none of these or related works addresses sce-
narios where the objectives are derived from principals
with differing beliefs, from which the priority-shifting
phenomenon of Theorem 3 arises. Differing beliefs are
likely to play a key role in negotiations, so for that pur-
pose, the formulation of multi-objective decision-making
adopted here is preferable.
2 Notation
Random variables are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g.,
S1, and lowercase letters, e.g., s1, are used as indices
ranging over the values of a variable, as in the equation
E[S1] =
∑
s1
P(s1) · s1.
Given a set A, the set of probability distributions on A is
denoted∆A.
Sequences are denoted by overbars, e.g., given a se-
quence (s1, . . . , sn), s¯ stands for the whole sequence.
Subsequences are denoted by subscripted inequalities,
so e.g., s≤4 stands for (s1, s2, s3), and s>4 stands for
(s5, . . . , sn).
3 Formalism
N.B.: All results in this paper generalize directly from
agents with two principals to agents with several, but for
clarity of exposition, the case of two principals will be
prioritized.
Consider a scenario wherein Alice and Bob will share
some cake, and have different predictions of the cake’s
color. Even if the color would be decision-irrelevant for
either Alice or Bob on their own (they don’t care what
color the cake is), we will show that the difference be-
tween their predictions will tend to make the cake color a
decision-relevant observation for a Pareto-optimal cake-
splitting policy that is adopted before they see the cake.
Specifically, we will show that Pareto-optimal policies
tend to incorporate some degree of bet-settling between
Alice and Bob, where the person who was more right
about the color of the cake will end up getting more of it.
Serving multiple principals as a single POMDP
To formalize such scenarios, where a single agent acts on
behalf of multiple principals, we need some definitions.
We encode each principal j’s view of the agent’s de-
cision problem as a finite horizon POMDP, Dj =
(Sj ,A, T j, U j ,O,Ωj , n), which simultaneously repre-
sents that principal’s beliefs about the environment, and
the principal’s utility function (see Russell et al. [2003]
for an introduction to POMDPs). These symbols take on
their usual meaning:
• Sj represents a set of possible states s of the envi-
ronment,
• A represents the set of possible actions a available
to the agent,
• T j represents the conditional probabilities principal
j believes will govern the environment state transi-
tions, i.e., Pj(si+1 | siai),
S1 S2 S3 S4
O1 A1 O2 A2 O3 A3
U
Figure 1: A POMDP with horizon n = 3 (in blue), being
solved by a full-memory policy (in green).
• U j represents principal j’s utility function from se-
quences of environmental states (s1, . . . , sn) to R;
for the sake of generality, U j is not assumed to be
additive over time, as reward functions often are,
• O represents the set of possible observations o of
the agent,
• Ωj represents the conditional probabilities principal
j believes will govern the agent’s observations, i.e.,
P
j(oi | si), and
• n is the horizon (number of time steps)
This POMDP structure is depicted by the Bayesian net-
work in Figure 1. (See Darwiche [2009] for an intro to
Bayesian networks.) At each point in time i, the agent
has a time-specific policy πi, which receives the agent’s
history,
hi := (o≤i, a<i),
and returns a distribution πi(− | hi) on actions ai, which
will then be used to generate an action ai with probability
π(ai | hi). Thus, principal j’s subjective probability of
an outcome (s¯, o¯, a¯) is given by a probability distribution
P
j that takes π as a parameter:
P
j(s¯, o¯, a¯;π) := Pj(s1) ·
n∏
i=1
P
j(oi | si)
π(ai | hi)P
j(si+1 | si, ai) (2)
Full-memory assumption. Every policy π in this paper
will be assumed to employ a “full memory”, so it decom-
poses into a sequence of policies πi for each time step.
In Figure 1, the part of the Bayes net governed by the
full-memory policy is highlighted in green.
Common knowledge assumptions. It is assumed that
the principals will have common knowledge of the (full-
memory) policy π = (π1, . . . , πn) they select for the
agent to implement, but that the principals may have dif-
ferent beliefs about how the environment works, and of
course different utility functions. It is also assumed that
the principals have common knowledge of one another’s
current beliefs at the time of the agent’s creation, which
we refer to as their their priors.
This last assumption is critical. During the agent’s cre-
ation, one should expect each principal’s beliefs to have
updated somewhat in response to disagreements from
the other. Assuming common knowledge of their priors
means assuming the principals to have reached an equi-
librium where, each knowing what the other believes,
they do not wish to further update their own beliefs.1
Pareto-optimal policies
A policy will be considered Pareto-optimal relative to a
set of POMDPs it could be deployed to solve.
Definition 1 (Compatible POMDPs). We say that two
POMDPs, D1 and D2, are compatible if any policy for
one may be viewed as a policy for the other, i.e., they
have the same set of actions A and observationsO, and
the same number of time steps n.
In this context, where a single policy π may be evaluated
relative to more than one POMDP, we use superscripts to
represent which POMDP is governing the probabilities
and expectations, e.g.,
E
j [U j ;π] :=
∑
s¯∈(Sj)n
P
j(s¯;π)U j(s¯)
represents the expectation in Dj of the utility function
U j , assuming policy π is followed.
Definition 2 (Pareto-optimal policies). A policy π
is Pareto-optimal for a set of compatible POMDPs
(D1, . . . , Dk) if for any other policy π′ and any j ∈
{1, . . . , k}
E
j [U j ;π′] > Ej [U j;π]⇒ (∃ℓ)
(
E
ℓ[U ℓ;π′] < Eℓ[U ℓ;π]
)
,
It is assumed that, before the agent’s creation, the princi-
pals will be seeking a Pareto-optimal (full-memory) pol-
icy for the agent to follow, relative to the POMDPs Dj
describing each principal’s view of the agent’s task.
1It is enough to assume the principals have reached a “per-
sistent disagreement” that cannot be mediated by the agent in
some way. Future work should design solutions for facilitating
the process of attaining common knowledge, or to obviate the
need to assume it.
Example: cake betting
A quantitative model of a cake betting scenario is laid out
in Table 1, and described as follows.
Alice (Principal 1) and Bob (Principal 2) are about to
be presented with a cake which they can choose to split
in half to share, or give entirely to one of them. They
have (built or purchased) a robot that will make the cake-
splitting decision on their behalf. Alice’s utility function
returns 0 if she gets no cake, 20 if she gets half a cake, or
30 if she gets a whole cake. Bob’s utility function values
Bob getting cake in the same way.
However, Alice and Bob have different beliefs about the
color of the cake. Alice is 90% sure that the cake is red
(S1 = O1 = “red”), versus 10% sure it will be green
(S1 = O1 = “green”), whereas Bob’s probabilities are
reversed.
Upon seeing the cake, the robot must decide to either
give Alice the entire cake (A1 = S2 = (all, none)), split
the cake half-and-half (A1 = S2 = (half, half)), or give
Bob the entire cake (A1 = S2 = (none, all)). More-
over, Alice and Bob have common knowledge of all these
facts.
Now, consider the following Pareto-optimal full-memory
policy that favors Alice (Principal 1) whenO1 is red, and
Bob (Principal 2) when O1 is green:
πˆ(− | red) = 100%(all, none)
πˆ(− | green) = 100%(none, all)
This policy can be viewed intuitively as a bet between
Alice and Bob about the value of O1, and is highly ap-
pealing to both principals:
E
1[U1; πˆ] = 90%(30) + 10%(0) = 27
E
2[U2; πˆ] = 10%(0) + 90%(30) = 27
In particular, πˆ is more appealing to both Alice and
Bob than an agreement to deterministically split the cake
(half, half), which would yield them each an expected
utility of 20. However,
Proposition 1. The Pareto-optimal strategy πˆ above can-
not be implemented by any agent that naı¨vely maximizes
a fixed-over-time linear combination of the conditionally
expected utilities of the two principals. That is, it cannot
be implemented by any policy π satisfying
π(− | o1) ∈ argmax
α∈∆A
(
r · E1[U1 | o1; a1 ∼ α] + (1− r)
·E2[U2 | o1; a1 ∼ α]
)
(3)
for some fixed r ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, every such policy
π is strictly worse than πˆ in expectation to one of the
principals.
S1 = O1 P
1(O1) P
2(O1) A1 = S2 U
1 U2
red cake 90% 10%
(all, none) 30 0
(half, half) 20 20
(none, all) 0 30
green cake 10% 90%
(all, none) 30 0
(half, half) 20 20
(none, all) 0 30
Table 1: An example scenario wherein a Pareto-optimal full-memory policy undergoes priority shifting (who gets the
cake), based on features that are decision-irrelevant for each principal (cake color).
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition is relatively unsurprising when one con-
siders the full-memory policy πˆ intuitively as a bet-
settling mechanism, because the nature of betting is to
favor different preferences based on future observations.
However, to be sure of this impossibility claim, one must
rule out the possibility that the πˆ could be implemented
by having the agent choose which element of the argmax
in Equation 3 to use based on whether the cake appears
red or green. (See appendix.)
Characterizing Pareto-optimality geometrically
With the definitions above, we can characterize a Pareto-
optimality as a geometric condition.
Policy mixing assumption. Given policies π1, . . . , πR
and a distribution α = (α1, . . . , αR) ∈ ∆{1, . . . , R},
we assume that the agent may construct a new policy by
choosing at time 0 between the πr with probability αr ,
and then executing the chosen policy for the rest of time.
We write this policy as π =
∑
r α
rπr,whence we derive:
E
j

U j ;∑
r
αrπr

 =∑
r
αrEj [U j ;πr]. (4)
Lemma 1 (Polytope Lemma). A full-memory policy π is
Pareto-optimal to principals 1 and 2 if and only if there
exist weights w1, w2 ≥ 0 with w1 + w2 = 1 such that
π ∈ argmax
π∗∈Π
(
w1E1[U1;π∗] + w2E2[U2;π∗]
)
(5)
Proof. Themixing assumption gives the set of policiesΠ
the structure of a convex space that the maps Ej [U j;−]
respect by Equation 4. This ensures that the image of the
map f : Π→ R2 given by
f(π) :=
(
E
1[U1;π], E2[U2;π]
)
is a closed, convex polytope. As such, a point (x, y) lies
on the Pareto boundary of image(f) if and only if there
B
S1 S2 S3 S4
O1 A1 O2 A2 O3 A3
U
Figure 2: A POMDP (mixture) with horizon n = 3 ini-
tialized by a Boolean B, being solved by a full-memory
policy (green)
exist nonnegative weights (w1, w2), not both zero, such
that
(x, y) ∈ argmax
(x∗,y∗)∈image(f)
(
w1x∗ + w2y∗
)
After normalizing w1 + w2 to equal 1, this implies the
result.
Characterizing Pareto-optimality probabilistically
To help us apply the Polytope Lemma, we will adopt an
interpretationwherein the weightswi are subjective prob-
abilities for the agent, as follows.
For any w ∈ ∆{1, 2}, we define a new POMDP, D, that
works by flipping a (w1, w2)-weighted coin, and then
running D1 or D2 thereafter, according to the coin flip.
We denote this by
D = w1D1 + w2D2,
and call D a POMDP mixture. A formal definition of D
is given in the appendix. It can be depicted by a Bayes
net by adding an additional environmental node for B in
the diagram ofD1 andD2 (see Figure 2).
Given any full-memory policy π, the expected payoff of
π in w1D1 + w2D2 is exactly
P(B = 1) · E[U | B = 1;π]
+ P(B = 2) · E[U | B = 2;π]
= w1E2[U1;π] + w2E2[U2;π]
Therefore, using the above definitions, Lemma 1 may be
restated in the following equivalent form:
Lemma 2 (Mixture Lemma). Given a pair (D1, D2) of
compatible POMDPs, a full-memory policy π is Pareto-
optimal for that pair if and only if there exists w ∈
∆{1, 2} such that π is an optimal full-memory policy for
the single POMDP given by w1D1 + w2D2.
Expressed in the form of Equation 5, it might not be
clear how a Pareto-optimal full-memory policy makes
use of its observations over time, aside from storing them
in memory. For example, is there any sense in which
the agent carries “beliefs” about the environment that it
“updates” at each time step? Lemma 2 allows us to re-
duce some such questions about Pareto-optimal policies
to questions about single POMDPs.
If π is an optimal full-memory policy for a single
POMDP, the optimality of each action distribution πi(− |
hi) can be characterized without reference to the previ-
ous policy components (π1, . . . , πi−1), nor to πi(− | h
′
i)
for any alternate history h′i. This can be expressed using
Pearl’s “Do()” notation [Pearl, 2009]:
Definition 3 (“do” notation). The probability of o¯
causally conditioned on a¯ is defined as
P
j(o¯ | Do(a¯))
:=
∑
s¯∈(Sj)n
P
j(s1) ·
n∏
i=1
P
j(oi | si)P
j(si+1 | siai)
Definition 4 (Expected utility abbreviation). For brevity,
given any POMDPD and policy π, we write
EDπ (α;hi) := E[U | hi; an ∼ α; π>i].
i.e., the total expected utility inD that would result from
replacing πi(− | hi) by α. This quantity does not depend
on π≤i.
Proposition 2 (Classical separability). IfD is a POMDP
described by conditional probabilities P(− | −) and util-
ity function U (as in Equation 2), then a full-memory pol-
icy π is optimal for D if and only if for each time step i
and each observation/action history hi, the action distri-
bution πi(− | hi) satisfies the following backward recur-
sion:
πi(− | hi) ∈ argmax
α∈∆A
(
P
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
· EDπ (α;hi)
)
This characterization of πi(−|hi) does not refer to
π1, . . . , πi−1, nor to πi(h
′
i) for any alternate history h
′
i.
Proof. This is just Bellman’s Principle of Optimality.
See [Bellman, 1957], Chap. III. 3.
N.B.: Unlike Bellman’s “backup” equation, the above
proposition requires no assumption whatsoever on the
form of the utility function. Note also that when the prob-
ability term P(o≤i | Do(a<i)) is non-zero, it may be re-
moved from the argmax without changing the theorem
statement. But when the term is zero, its presence is es-
sential, and implies that πi(− | hi) can be anything.
It turns out that Pareto-optimality can be characterized in
a similar way by backward recursion from the final time
step. The resulting recursion reveals a pattern in how the
weights on the principals’ conditionally expected utilities
must change over time, which is the main result of this
paper:
Theorem 3 (Pareto-optimal control theorem). Given a
pair (D1, D2) of compatible POMDPs with horizon n, a
full-memory policy π is Pareto-optimal if and only if its
components πi for i ≤ n satisfy the following backward
recursion for some weights w ∈ ∆{1, 2}:
πi(− | hi) ∈ argmax
α∈∆A
(
w1P1
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
·ED
1
π (α;hi)
+ w2P2
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
·ED
2
π (α;hi)
)
In words, to achieve Pareto-optimality, the agent must
1. use each principal’s own world-modelDj when es-
timating the degree ED
j
π (α;hi) to which a decision
α favors that principal’s utility function, and
2. shift the relative priority of each principal’s ex-
pected utility in the agent’s maximizationtarget over
time, by a factor proportional to how well that
principal’s prior predicts the agent’s observations,
P
i
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
.
N.B.: The analogous result for more than two POMDPs
holds as well, with essentially the same proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemma 2, the Pareto-optimality
of π for (D1, D2) is equivalent to its classical optimality
forD = w1D1+w2D2 for some (w1, w2). Writing P for
probabilities in D, Proposition 2 says this is equivalent to
α = πi(− | hi) maximizing the following expression
F (α) for each i:
F (α) = P
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
·EDπ (α;hi). (6)
The expectation factor on the right equals
EDπ (α;hi) = P
(
B = 1 | o≤i,Do(a<i)
)
·ED
1
π (α;hi)
+ P
(
B = 2 | o≤i,Do(a<i)
)
·ED
2
π (α;hi).
Multiplying by
P
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
= w1P1
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
+ w2P2
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
and applying Bayes’ rule yields that
F (α) = w1P1
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
ED
1
π (α;hi)
+ w2P2
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
ED
2
π (α;hi),
hence the result.
To see the necessity of the Pj terms that shift the expecta-
tion weights in Theorem 3 over time, recall from Propo-
sition 1 that, without these, some Pareto-optimal policies
cannot be implemented. These Pj terms are responsible
for the “bet-settling” phenomena discussed in the intro-
duction.
However, when the principals have the same beliefs, they
aways assign the same probability to the agent’s obser-
vations, so the weights on their respective valuations do
not change over time. Hence, as a special instance, we
derive:
Corollary 4 (Harsanyi’s utility aggregation formula).
Suppose that principals 1 and 2 share the same beliefs
about the environment, i.e., the pair (D1, D2) of compat-
ible POMDPs agree on all parameters except the prin-
cipals’ utility functions U1 6= U2. Then a full-memory
policy π is Pareto-optimal if and only if there exists
w ∈ ∆{1, 2} such that for i ≤ n, πi satisfies
πi(− | hi) ∈ argmax
α∈∆A
(
E[w1U1 + w2U2] | hi; ai ∼ α; π>i]
)
where E = E1 = E2 denotes the shared expectations of
both principals.
Proof. Setting E = E1 = E2 in Theorem 3, factor-
ing out the common coefficient P1
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
=
P
2
(
o≤i | Do(a<i)
)
, and applying linearity of expecta-
tion yields the result.
4 Conclusion
Theorem 3 exhibits a novel form for the objective of a
sequential decision-making policy that is Pareto-optimal
according to principals with differing beliefs.
This form represents two departures from naı¨ve utility
aggregation: to achieve Pareto-optimality for principals
with differing beliefs, an agent must (1) use each princi-
pal’s own beliefs (updated on the agent’s observations)
when evaluating how well an action will serve that prin-
cipal’s utility function, and (2) shift the relative priority
it assigns to each principal’s expected utilities over time,
by a factor proportional to how well that principal’s prior
predicts the agent’s observations.
Implications for contract design
Theorem 3 has implications for modeling and structur-
ing the process of contract design. If a contract is being
created between principals with different beliefs, then to
the extent that the principals will target Pareto-optimality
among them as an objective, there will be a tendency for
the contract to end up implicitly settling bets between
the principals. Perhaps making the bet-settling nature of
Pareto-optimal contract design more explicit might help
to design contracts that are more attractive to both prin-
cipals, along the lines illustrated by Proposition 1. This
could potentially lead to more successful negotiations,
provided the principals remained willing to uphold the
contract after its implicit bets have been settled.
Implications for shareable AI systems
Proposition 1 shows how the Pareto-optimal form of
Theorem 3 is more attractive—from the perspective of
the principals—than policies that do not account for dif-
ferences in their beliefs. The relative attractiveness of
shared ownership versus individual ownership of AI sys-
tems may be essential to the technological adoption of
shared systems. Consider the following product substitu-
tions that might be enabled by the development of share-
able machine learning systems:
• Office assistant software jointly controlled by a
team, as an improvement over personal assistant
software for each member of the team.
• A team of domestic robots controlled by a family,
as an improvement over individual robots each con-
trolled by a separate family member.
• A web-based security system shared by several in-
terested companies or nations, as an improvement
over individual security systems deployed by each
group.
It may represent a significant technical challenge for
any of these substitutions to become viable. However,
machine learning systems that are able to approximate
Pareto-optimality as an objective are more likely to be
sufficiently appealing to motivate the switch from indi-
vidual control to sharing.
Implications for bargaining versus racing
Consider two nations—allies or adversaries—who must
decide whether to cooperate in the deployment of a very
powerful and autonomous AI system.
If the nations cannot reach agreement as to what policy
a jointly owned AI system should follow, joint owner-
ship may be less attractive than building separate AI sys-
tems, one for each party. This could lead to an arms race
between nations competing under time pressure to de-
velop ever more powerful militarized AI systems. Under
such race conditions, everyone loses, as each nation is af-
forded less time to ensure the safety and value alignment
of its own system.
The first author’s primary motivation for this paper is to
initiate a research program with the mission of averting
such scenarios. Beginning work today on AI architec-
tures that are more amenable to joint ownership could
help lead to futures wherein powerful entities are more
likely to share and less likely to compete for the owner-
ship of such systems.
Future work
Insofar as Theorem 3 is not particularly mathematically
sophisticated—it employs only basic facts about con-
vexity and linear algebra—this suggests there may be
more low-hanging fruit to be found in the domain of
“machine implementable social choice theory”. Future
work should address methods for helping the principals
to share information—perhaps in exchange for adjust-
ments to the weights in Theorem 3—to reach either a
state of agreement or a persistent disagreement that al-
lows the theorem to be applied. More ambitiously, bar-
gaining models that account for a degree of transparency
between the principals should be employed, as individual
humans and institutions have some capacity for detecting
one another’s intentions.
As well, scenarios where the principals continue to ex-
hibit some active control over the system after its creation
should be modeled in detail. In real life, principals usu-
ally continue to exist in their agents’ environments, and
accounting for this will be a separate technical challenge.
As a final motivating remark, consider that social choice
theory and bargaining theory were both pioneered dur-
ing the Cold War, when it was particularly compelling to
understand the potential for cooperation between human
institutions that might behave competitively. In the com-
ing decades, machine intelligence will likely bring many
new challenges for cooperation, as well as new means to
cooperate, and new reasons to do so. As such, new tech-
nical aspects of social choice and bargaining will likely
continue to emerge.
5 Appendix
Here we make available the technical details for defin-
ing POMDP mixtures, and proving that certain Pareto-
optimal expectations cannot be obtained without priority-
shifting.
Definition 5 (POMDP mixtures). Suppose that D1 and
D2 are compatible POMDPs, with parameters Dj =
(Sj ,A, T j, U j ,O,Ωj , n). Define a new POMDP com-
patible with both, denoted D = w1D1 + w2D2, with
parametersDj = (S,A, T, U,O,Ω, n), as follows:
• S := {(j, s) | j ∈ {1, 2}, s ∈ Sj},
• Environmental transition probabilities T given by
P
(
(j, s1)
)
:= wj · Pj(s1)
for any initial state s1 ∈ S
j , and thereafter,
P
(
(j′, si+1) | (j, si), ai
)
:=

P
j
(
si+1 | siai
)
if j′ = j
0 if j′ 6= j
Hence, the value of j will be constant over time, so a
full history for the environment may be represented
by a pair
(j, s¯) ∈ {1} × (S1)n ∪ {2} × (S2)n.
Let B denote the boolean random variable that
equals whichever constant value of j obtains, so
then
P(B = j) = wj
• The utility function U is given by
U(j, s¯) := U j(s¯)
• The observation probabilities Ω are given by
P
(
oi | (j, si)
)
:= P(B = j) · Pj(oi | si)
In particular, the agent does not observe directly
whether j = 1 or j = 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose π is any policy satisfy-
ing Equation 3 for some fixed r, and consider the follow-
ing cases for r:
1. If r < 1/3, then π must satisfy
π(− | o1) = 100%(none, all).
Here, E1[U1;π] = 0 < 27, so π is strictly worse
than πˆ in expectation to Alice.
2. If r = 1/3, then π must satisfy
π(− | o1) = q(o1)(none, all)+(1−q(o1))(half, half)
for some q(o1) ∈ [0, 1] depending on o1. Here,
E
1[U1;π] ≤ 20 < 27 (with equality when q(red) =
q(green) = 1), so π is strictly worse than πˆ in ex-
pectation to Alice.
3. If 1/3 < r < 2/3, then π must satisfy
π(− | o1) = 100%(half, half)
Here, E1[U1;π] = E2[U2;π] = 20 < 27, so π is
strictly worse than πˆ in expectation to both Alice
and Bob.
The remaining cases, r = 2/3 and r > 2/3, are symmet-
ric to the first two, with Bob in place of Alice and (none,
all) in place of (all, none).
Hence, no fixed linear combination of the principals’
utility functions can be maximized to simultaneously
achieve an expected utility of 27 for both players.
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